damaged in shipment. After the parties enter into arbitration, the arbitrator first decides that Company A must be paid in full for the widgets successfully delivered. Before the arbitrator can decide the remaining claims, however, Company B goes to federal court to have the partial award vacated. Should a court be able to exercise jurisdiction over Company B's claim?
The FAA requires that courts give broad deference to an arbitrator's decisions and decline to review the arbitrator's awards until he or she has issued a final judgment. Under the longstanding judicial interpretation of what constitutes a final arbitral award as required by 9 USC § 10(a)(4)-an interpretation that consciously tracks the final judgment rule-partial awards may not be enforced. Recently, however, some courts have adopted a more flexible understanding of finality. In doing so, they have exercised jurisdiction over claims by parties seeking to enforce partial arbitral awards. These courts reason that a strict definition of finality might actually impede the swift resolution of arbitral disputes by making the parties wait for enforcement of a ruling on one issue until the arbitrator has ruled on the other issues in the case. They support the exercise of jurisdiction over the partial awards by drawing analogies to FRCP 54(b), which permits interlocutory review of a district court order when such review furthers the twin goals of expediency and judicial efficiency
In this Comment, however, I outline several reasons why courts should adhere to the longstanding rule forbidding interlocutory review and not loosen the finality requirement embodied in Section 10(a)(4). First, the analogy between a court's review of a partial arbitral award and an appellate court's review of a district court's partial judgment is inapt. While Rule 54(b) expressly grants appellate courts the power to review district courts' partial judgments, the FAA makes no corresponding grant of authority to courts to review partial arbitral awards. Second, the relaxed approach to arbitral finality undermines 5 FRCP 54(b) provides: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(emphasis added). the goal of deference to arbitrators. Third, arbitration is a creature of contract, and courts should not "rewrite" the contract ex post.
In Part I, I examine the motivation behind the FAA, the benefits of arbitration, and the finality requirement for judicial review. In Part II, I scrutinize the caselaw that has recently deviated from the finality requirement. Finally, in Part III, I recommend that courts should not loosen the finality requirement because there is no congressional authorization to do so, and such an interpretation would undermine Congress's pro-arbitration policy. Furthermore, the parties can always contract around anticipated problems by explicitly providing for interlocutory review.
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT
Before analyzing the arguments for and against interlocutory appeals of arbitration, one must understand the background of the FAA, as well as the proper role of the courts to promote arbitration. Federal policy is pro-arbitration, and this policy may be properly promoted only by limiting the instances in which courts can intervene.
A. Arbitration
Originally passed in 1925, the FAA was designed by Congress to allow parties to avoid "the costliness and delays of litigation ' and, at a time of severe judicial hostility to arbitration, to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts. ' 8 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly acknowledged-as recently as January 20029-that judicial hostility to arbitral agreements was the primary motivation for the Act's passage and that the avoidance of costs and delays was merely secondary.'° Since the passage of the FAA, federal policy has consistently encouraged arbitration and has directed courts to re-
6
Scherk v Alberto-Culver Co, 417 US 506, 510-11 (1974) .
7
Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 US 20, 24 (1991) (noting that the FAA was enacted to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts"). [70:663 solve any questions concerning the scope of arbitrable issues on the side of arbitrability."
Given the importance that Congress places on providing parties with the opportunity to arbitrate, it is useful to consider how parties may benefit from arbitration. Congress encourages arbitration because it has many qualities that make it a valuable alternative to litigation. 2 The hallmarks of arbitration, "access to expertise"' 3 and "adaptability,"" are hard to find in traditional litigation. Because arbitration is a private system of justice that is entered into voluntarily via contract," parties can tailor their dispute resolution to their specific commercial needs.1 6 For example, parties can contract over what issues will be arbitrated,' 7 the choice of forum,' 8 the type of arbitrator to pre- (1983) (noting that the FAA manifests "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements").
12
Of course it should be noted that there can also be a downside to arbitration. One common concern is that when an experienced player in arbitration (such as a large manufacturer) arbitrates with a novice (such as a small supplier), the experienced player will have an advantage by being more familiar with the system and because the arbitrator may tend to favor the experienced player in order to get repeat business. However, given that arbitration agreements are voluntarily entered into, there is a presumption that the benefits outweigh the downside. Labor relations have today become a highly complicated and technical field.... It has developed its own vocabulary... In the nature of things few judges can have had any very extensive experience in the field of industrial relations. Arbitrators, on the other hand, are compelled to acquire a knowledge of industrial processes, modes of compensation, complex incentive plans, job classifications, shift arrangements, and procedures for layoff and recall.
14 "The presentation of evidence and argument in litigation is governed by rules of procedure and evidence enacted by the government. In contrast, the rules of procedure and evidence in arbitration are, with few exceptions, whatever the contract says they are." Stephen J. In choosing the type of arbitrator desired, the parties can choose an expert in the subject matter being disputed. An expert is often preferred to a jury, which may not understand complex technical issues, or a judge, who is by necessity a generalist. When both parties are confident that any potential disputes will be resolved by an industry expert who understands the background of the dispute, and therefore will make decisions more efficiently and more accurately than a judge, the range of contractual possibilities greatly expands. 6 Also, allowing those with expertise to decide the dispute indirectly benefits the pubing clauses requiring arbitration in accordance with the rules of some private organization are designating the private organization as the exclusive arbitral forum). Arbitration reduces the cost and length of litigation. Parties who agree to arbitrate trade "the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." ' There is typically less discovery than in regular litigation; procedures are informal; there are fewer motions; the hearings are shorter; and appeals are limited. Therefore, arbitration will often proceed more quickly than litigation. While a typical employment dispute takes 2.5 years to resolve in court, 29 the average arbitration takes 8.6 months."
There is a greater degree of privacy in arbitration. In litigation, sensitive information normally becomes part of the public record. 31 Courts rarely grant motions to seal this information, even if the parties had previously entered into a secrecy agreement. 2 With arbitration, the existence of the dispute can be kept private, including the nature of the claims and allegations, as well as the documents and testimony." This prevents the dispute from ending up on the front page of 33 Closed arbitration is "a sure path to dispute resolution with complete confidentiality." Baxter, 297 F3d at 548.
[70:663 pany B that will have access to this information, if dispositive of the dispute, but potentially all buyers and fellow competitors. 3 In an effort to promote arbitration, the FAA purposefully limits the ability of courts to review arbitral awards. 35 The less involved courts are in the process, the more parties will see arbitration as a viable alternative to litigation. While the FAA authorizes federal courts to enforce arbitral awards,3 ' it greatly limits the grounds on which a court can vacate an arbitral award. These grounds are generally wholly divorced from the merits of an arbitrator's decisions so as to avoid the danger of undermining the integrity of the arbitral process. The nar- 
36
The federal courts have jurisdiction only over contracts involving interstate commerce or maritime transactions. 9 USC § 2 states that all written arbitration provisions in "any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable [in federal court], save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 USC § 1 defines "maritime transactions" and "commerce" and notes that the FAA will not apply to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 
2003]
avoiding the waste of judicial resources and not allowing parties to delay justice or harass the other side by using seriatim appeals. Over time, there have been a few exceptions to the finality requirement in our legal system, but the large majority of these exceptions are statutory. Of those, FRCP 54(b) is the most relevant for our purposes because the courts that have applied a loosened finality requirement under the FAA have done so by analogy to this rule.
1. The FAA's finality requirement: 9 USC § 10(a)(4).
One way of narrowing the scope of judicial review, and hence promoting arbitration, is to impose a finality requirement for judicial review of arbitral awards. Section 10(a) lists the limited instances in which a federal court can vacate an arbitral award: (1) where the award was procured by "corruption, fraud, or undue means;" (2) where there was "evident partiality" or "corruption in the arbitrators;" (3) where there was "misconduct" or "misbehavior" on the part of the arbitrator; and (4) where the arbitrators "exceeded their power" or so "imperfectly executed" them that a "mutual, final, and definite" award is not possible and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired.
Courts have interpreted Section 10(a)(4), which requires a "mutual, final, and definite" award, to impose a finality requirement on judicial review of such awards because a vacatur is only appropriate under Section 10(a)(4) when arbitrators "imperfectly execute" their powers and issue an award purported to be final but which, in fact, is not.'4 Although Congress could have made the finality requirement more explicit by not inserting it in the midst of a list of grounds on which an arbitrator's decision can be vacated, the courts have found the language of the Act to be unambiguous on this point. 4 ' A "final" award means that arbitration must be "complete ' '4 ' and "not interlocu-
39
USC § 10(a)(1)-(4). 40 See Michaels v Mariforum Shipping, SA, 624 F2d 411, 414 (2d Cir 1980). The court also noted: "That section has no application to an interim award that the arbitrators did not intend to be their final determination on the issues submitted to them." Id. 41 See id:
[I]t is only after an award has been made by the arbitrators that a party can seek to attack any of the arbitrators' determinations in court. tory," 3 which in turn means that the arbitrator must have already decided all issues presented, including both liability and damages." Combined with the term "mutual," it means that all issues involving all parties have been decided. "Definite" means that "the award is sufficiently clear and specific to be enforced should it be confirmed by the district court and thus made judicially enforceable. ' ' 5 Where courts have deviated from strict adherence to the final judgment rule, they have done so by playing with the definitions of these terms-not by attacking whether the FAA has a finality requirement for judicial jurisdiction.46 2. The final judgment rule.
The final judgment rule has long been a part of our American jurisprudence because of the benefits it provides to the legal system. Congress adopted the same finality requirement, incorporated in Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, to maintain those benefits. Historically, courts have stringently enforced the FAA's finality requirement in the same way they have enforced the final judgment rule. 7 In other words, a district court can only enforce an arbitral award under the same circumstances that a court of appeals can review a judgment of the district court-if the decision disposes of all claims involving all parties on the merits. For many decades, the interpretation of arbitral finality has tracked the definition of finality provided by the final judgment rule. The well-accepted purpose of the final judgment rule is to avoid wasting judicial resources." 8 Multiple appeals for the same case take up appellate judges' time," and the issues the appellate court decides may become moot by decisions on later issues. The final judgment rule also keeps litigants from using seriatim appeals as a tool of delay or harassment." Exceptions to this rule, such as FRCP 54(b), are therefore to be granted neither lightly nor routinely. 52 The Supreme Court frequently has noted that this requirement "is not one of those technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth working of our federal system." 53 The finality requirement of the FAA therefore serves a twofold purpose: It protects Congress's proarbitration policy by preventing courts from unduly interfering in private contract in the face of judicial hostility toward arbitration ' and streamlines the process, for example by preventing parties from shuttling back and forth between the arbitrator and court.
3.
Exceptions to the final judgment rule. Rule 54(b) was originally adopted in view of the wide scope and possible content of the newly created 'civil action' in order to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim to await adjudication of the entire case. It was not designed to overturn the settled federal rule [prohibiting piecemeal disposal of litigation except in special instances covered by statute.
56
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated in 1938, when Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act, 28 USC § 2072, authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate procedural rules. The Supreme Court, in turn, delegated its authority to committees of the Judicial Conference, which is a supervisory and administrative arm of the federal courts.
ponentially." 7 The rulemakers were particularly concerned with the potential delays in justice resulting from the rigidity of the final judgment rule," and therefore sought to fashion a few well-defined exceptions to the final judgment rule. 9 These exceptions include 28 USC § 1292, which allows interlocutory appeals in limited circumstances;,o 28 USC § 1651, which authorizes grants of extraordinary writs of mandamus; 6' FRCP 23(f), which allows interlocutory appeals for class certification orders at the discretion of the appellate court; and the collateral order doctrine, which allows orders to be considered final if the order will "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. ' 
' 3
The exception that bears the most on piecemeal appeals of arbi- 60 Section 1292(a)(1) allows interlocutory appeals from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions." Sections 1292(a)(2) and (a)(3) allow interlocutory appeals for orders dealing with receiverships and determinations of rights and liabilities in admiralty cases respectively. Section 1292(b) allows an interlocutory appeal with the permission of both the district court judge and court of appeals for orders involving a "controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion." In reality, § 1292(b) is used very rarely. In 1989, there were roughly 40,000 federal appeals filed. See Diana G. Culp 64 FRCP 54(b) states: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
judgment rule-expedience and judicial efficiency-can best be served by allowing exceptions to the rule. One can imagine situations in which claims in a lawsuit are sufficiently unrelated that the disposition of one claim would not affect the disposition of others. In such situations, delaying the appeal and final resolution of an interlocutory order deciding such a claim would serve no purpose and could, indeed, cause useless delay. 6 Thus, the 1946 amendment to FRCP 54(b) allows a district court, in a case with multiple claims, to enter a final judgment to dispose of one or fewer than all of the claims for review, but "only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."6 In 1961, FRCP 54(b) was amended to allow the district court not only to enter a final judgment for "one or more but fewer than all" 6'7 of the claims, but also for one or more but fewer than all of the parties." FRCP 54(b) contains an important safeguard: It mandates that the district court must certify that there is no just reason for delay. This certification requirement allows district judges to retain control over their own cases and decide when piecemeal review is beneficial. This is important because it reduces the chance that the appellate court will be given an issue to decide that, if reversed, could have an adverse affect on the rest of the proceedings remaining before the district judge.
II. DEVIATIONS FROM THE FINALITY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 10(a)(4)
In recent years, a few courts of appeal have departed from the strict finality requirement 9 and have allowed appeals of partial arbitral awards for those claims viewed as independent from the remaining claims still before the arbitrator. These courts justify their decisions by relying on the rationales supporting FRCP 54(b). They emphasize that it makes little sense not to enforce part of an award if it is Id. 68 Id. The change was made because "[t]he danger of hardship through delay of appeal until the whole action is concluded may be at least as serious in the multiple-parties situations as in multiple-claims cases." FRCP 54(b), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1961 Amendments. factually and conceptually unrelated to the other claims that remain before the arbitrators. These courts note that one reason arbitration is preferred over litigation is because of the expectation that it will be less expensive. 0 If interlocutory review of the issues is not allowed, they reason, it will cost the parties more money and time. Only a few circuit courts have deviated from the finality requirement, and at least one of those circuits-the Seventh-has recently expressed misgivings about its departure from strict adherence to the final judgment rule regarding arbitral awards.
Part A reviews Second and Seventh Circuit cases in which courts most significantly have departed from the finality requirement for judicial review of partial arbitral awards. Part B then examines a series of First Circuit cases in which the parties agreed to bifurcate arbitration into two distinct phases: an initial phase resolving liability and a second phase awarding damages. In such cases, the First Circuit permits judicial review of arbitral awards, even when only one of the phases of arbitration has been completed. In doing so, however, it relies on precedent that is unconvincing and not on point. An agreement to bifurcate the proceeding into two distinct phases does not mean that the parties have agreed to interlocutory review.
A. Cases Relaxing the FAA's Finality Requirement
The Second Circuit was the first circuit court to adopt a relaxed interpretation of the finality requirement. Previously, the Second Circuit interpreted the finality rule strictly, stating that in order for an arbitral award to be considered final it had to be "intended by the arbitrators to be their complete determination of all claims submitted to them .... not only [as to] liability, but also . .. damages." 7 ' The court's position changed, however, with its decision in Metallgesellschaft AG v M/V Capitan Constante, 2 in which it argued that when necessary, the final judgment rule could be deviated from in order to meet the purpose of arbitration. 
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Metallgesellschaft involved a dispute arising out of a shipping contract for fuel oil. The ship Capitan Constante transported and delivered freight for Metallgesellschaft, but Metallgesellschaft did not pay, alleging short delivery and fuel contamination." In keeping with their contract, the parties entered into arbitration, in which the arbitration panel made a partial award in favor of Capitan Constante for the value of the unpaid freight. 75 The Second Circuit took jurisdiction over the case and upheld enforcement of the partial arbitral award, even though the panel had not yet decided the other issues before it. 76 The court was motivated to assert jurisdiction based on the strength of the underlying claim. 77 It emphasized that if the claim had been brought in a court of law instead of arbitrated, Capitan Constante would undoubtedly be entitled to summary judgment for the amount of the unpaid freight." The court considered it "a perversion" that resolution of a claim could occur more quickly in litigation than in arbitration. 9 The court stated that fairness required prompt payment because the goal of arbitration is to permit quick and inexpensive resolution of contractual disputes. " Therefore, it held that the issue of whether Metallgesellschaft was liable for the freight was an independent issue from the payment. 8 ' In a dissent, Judge Wilfred Feinberg wrote that courts should not create exceptions to the final judgment rule for arbitration because such an action requires congressional approval." Furthermore, he reasoned, while hearing the case at bar might result in speedier resolution of one party's claims, the long-term effect of allowing piecemeal judicial review would be to "make arbitration more complicated, time consuming and expensive ' with an increasing number of parties demanding such review. The Seventh Circuit has also allowed judicial review of a partial arbitral award, based on the same policy arguments made in Metallgesellschaft. In Publicis Communication v True North Communications, Inc, ' two parties entered into a joint venture and agreed to arbitrate almost all disputes arising from their partnership.n After their joint venture fell apart, the parties entered into arbitration. One of the issues submitted for arbitration was whether Publicis had to turn over its tax records to True North." Despite an order from the arbitrator to turn over these records, Publicis refused.o In response, True North filed a claim in federal court to have the arbitrator's order enforced.
The court held that an arbitral order requiring one party to hand over its tax records to the other party would be treated as a final order, and hence reviewable, because considered in isolation, the order was final7 despite the fact that the order did not end the arbitration. The court justified its decision by saying that while "[a]rbitration can be an effective way to resolve a dispute in less time, at less expense, and with less rancor than litigating in the courts [,] [a]rbitration loses some of its luster ... when one party refuses to abide by the outcome and the courts are called in after all for enforcement."' ' The Seventh Circuit has recently questioned the legitimacy of this reasoning. In IDS Life Insurance Co v Royal Alliance Association," the court criticized the Publicis decision. The court noted that while decisions such as Publicis employ a regime similar to the one that Rule 54(b) creates for federal litigation, this regime "is in tension with the absence from the Federal Arbitration Act of any counterpart to that rule. ' ' " The IDS Life Insurance court stressed that "final" and "mutual" mean "that the arbitrators ... have resolved the entire dispute (to the extent arbitrable) that had been submitted to them." 93 will do so.... It will make arbitration more like litigation, a result not to be desired. 
B. Cases Involving Bifurcation Agreements
In Hart Surgical, Inc v UltraCision, Inc,94 the First Circuit, relying on Metallgesellschaft," held that when the parties formally agree to bifurcate the liability and damages phases, a court has the power to review the arbitrator's decision after the arbitrator decides the liability issue, but before he or she determines damages.6
In Hart Surgical, the parties had entered into a contract in which Hart agreed to be the exclusive Canadian distributor for UltraCision's products. This contract contained an arbitration clause." A few years later, UltraCision terminated the distributorship for nonperformance. Upon commencing arbitration, the parties agreed to bifurcate the arbitration into liability and damages phases, with the approval of the arbitration panel.9 The arbitrators decided that UltraCision was liable for wrongfully terminating the distribution agreement."O UltraCision filed a motion to vacate that award." 0 ' However, both parties agreed to stay the request in order to "facilitate a settlement" and "avoid the unnecessary expenditure of time and effort."' 1 2
The damages stage in arbitration stalled, and UltraCision urged the federal court to review the arbitrator's finding of liability. ' The district court dismissed UltraCision's motion, holding that under the FAA the award was not final, and therefore jurisdiction by the court was not proper.' The court reasoned that since the parties had asked the arbitrators to decide both liability and damages, an appeal of only one of these decisions was akin to an interlocutory appeal and thus impermissible under the statute. '°5 The First Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that the district court had jurisdiction to review liability.'° Acknowledging the current circuit split, the court limited its holding to situations in which the parties have formally agreed to bifurcate at the arbitration stage.' 2
The First Circuit nevertheless extended Hart Surgical's reach in Providence Journal Co v Providence Newspaper Guild' by permitting review of a partial arbitral award despite the lack of a formal bifurcation agreement.1 In that case, the parties arbitrated a dispute over the interpretation of a clause in their collective bargaining agreement." 0 At the arbitration hearing, the parties informally agreed to bifurcate the proceedings into liability and damages."' After the arbitrator found one party liable, he ordered the parties to try to negotiate an acceptable remedy but retained jurisdiction in case the parties failed." 2 After the parties failed to reach an agreement, Providence Journal filed a motion in federal court to vacate the arbitral award, " ' even though the arbitrator had not relinquished jurisdiction. The circuit court held that judicial review of a partial arbitral award was appropriate because the parties intended to bifurcate the phases-formality did not matter." ' Furthermore, the court argued, if the arbitrator had not intended the decision on liability to be final, he would not have felt the need to state he was retaining jurisdiction over the remaining
issues."' Therefore, the court found review proper." 6 The First Circuit has thus made a quick and sharp deviation from the finality requirement under the FAA. While the Seventh Circuit similarly has deviated from the rule, the doubts the court expressed in IDS Life Insurance may indicate that the court will move back to strict adherence to the final judgment rule.
III. ADVANTAGES OF THE FAA's FINALITY REQUIREMENT
This Part explains why enforcing partial arbitral awards violates the finality requirement in Section 10(a)(4) and contradicts the FAA's broader policies. It also answers the concerns that have led several courts to loosen the finality requirement. First, arbitration is a creature of contract and allows parties to prevent more cumbersome arbitration proceedings, if they so desire. If they fail to do so, however, the court should not "rewrite" the parties' contract by providing a more streamlined process. Such action would benefit one party at the expense of the other. Second, the relaxed approach to finality undermines the FAA's goal of deferring to arbitrators by interfering before the arbitrator has used his or her expertise, for which he or she was hired, to decide the entire dispute. Third, analogies drawn to Rule 54(b) are inapt. There is no parallel provision in the FAA leading to the negative inference that Congress did not intend to authorize an exception to the final judgment rule. Further, Rule 54(b) permits interlocutory appeals only where the district court certifies that it is expeditious to do so. Courts that have exercised jurisdiction over partial arbitral awards by analogizing to Rule 54(b) have failed to even mention this important measure. Finally, it is not clear that a looser finality requirement will bring about a quicker, less expensive dispute resolution, as deviating courts hope.
A. Arbitration Is a Creature of Contract
One reason there is little cause for concern over the lack of piecemeal judicial review is that arbitration is a creature of contract. If there are circumstances unique to the parties, they can tailor their dispute resolution in a manner satisfactory to both sides. This weakens the argument that courts must intervene in order to protect parties from long, drawn-out disputes. In fact, courts should not allow piecemeal judicial review when the parties have not contracted for it because doing so rewrites the bargain that the parties struck ex ante.
1. Parties may craft the ground rules for arbitration.
Courts cannot justify judicial review simply on the need to ensure a speedy resolution to the parties' disputes. Arbitration gives the parties themselves the opportunity to craft the format and scope of any arbitration proceeding. Parties can require, for example, only one claim per arbitration proceeding. They can also limit the scope of discovery and evidentiary rules. ' These measures have a great effect on the length and breadth of any dispute resolution, and can control the scope of arbitration and avoid surprise. Hence, we should not be as worried about parties in an arbitration proceeding as we are about 117 See notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
[70:663 parties in litigation. It is more important to adhere to the parties' contract than to allow a court to rewrite their contract in an attempt to get a speedier resolution. The FAA was passed because when it came to arbitration clauses, courts failed to place parties' agreements on the same footing as other contracts. 1 8 When time is of the essence, parties can ensure that time-saving devices are built into the contract. For example, the clause could provide that all issues raised in arbitration must be decided within six months. The agreed-upon arbitrator would have to agree to this time limit; the salary paid could be raised as needed for this to be accomplished. This addresses the Second Circuit's concerns over quick payment for freight, for example. If parties choose not to include this provision, then there is no reason for a court to be paternalistically concerned.
Existence of bifurcation agreements underscores parties'
abilities to contract. Arbitrations in which there is an agreement to bifurcate the proceedings and arbitrations in which there is not such an agreement pose conceptually different issues because in the former agreement the parties have contracted away from the default rules that the FAA provides. When the parties explicitly agree ex ante to divide up the arbitration, it is more convincing to allow judicial review of partial arbitral awards. This is subject, however, to the qualification that the parties in their agreement have explicitly agreed to judicial review of partial arbitral awards and not just requested that the arbitrator decide the issues sequentially via bifurcation. " 9 The fact that parties can agree to bifurcate indicates that the parties are capable of arranging for piecemeal judicial review. One reason why parties may agree to bifurcate liability and damages but not agree to piecemeal judicial review is because it is not clear that allowing judicial review of the liability phase before the arbitrator decides damages is quicker than allowing the arbitrator to determine both liability and damages before the district court reviews the awards.
The First Circuit has allowed judicial review of partial arbitral awards for cases in which the parties have a bifurcation agreement. In none of these cases, however, including Hart Surgical, 2° did the parties explicitly agree to piecemeal judicial review. Furthermore, the reliance 119 Parties agree to bifurcate liability and damages because it is quicker to decide liability first. Then, if there is liability, the expensive process of discovery and hiring of experts can begin for the purpose of determining damages.
on Metallgesellschaft, which did not contain a bifurcation agreement, indicates that the First Circuit may be willing to adopt the broader departure from the finality requirement.
3. Allowing review of partial arbitral awards effectively rewrites the parties' contract.
We should be bothered when courts attempt to change the process for which the parties bargained. By doing so, the courts are essentially rewriting the parties' contract, which helps one party (who benefits from the quick resolution) and hurts another (who benefits from proceeding in the way dictated by the agreement).
In addition, speed is not the sole consideration of the parties. If it were, both sides would agree to flip a coin to decide their disputes. Rather, parties voluntarily choose arbitration because they specifically want to avoid the courts and/or want an adjudicator with expertise in their field. To allow the courts to become involved in the process ahead of schedule is to upset the bargained-for contract by allowing judges to speak on the issues before the contracted-for expert has spoken on all of the issues involved in the dispute.
4. Judicial review of partial arbitral awards does not necessarily reduce costs and result in a speedier dispute resolution.
Even if speed and cost reduction were the sole considerations of the alternative dispute resolution process, ' it is far from clear that piecemeal review results in a quicker, cheaper resolution. Superficially it may appear to lower the expected cost of resolving a dispute because an affirmation of no liability saves both sides from the cost of disputing damages. However, this deviation from the finality requirement may burden society even more in terms of both time and money. The number of parties who will run to the public courts to seek interlocutory appeal will increase, putting a greater burden on taxpayers, not to mention the parties 1 2 It also may reduce the settlement range between the two parties. The expected value of the plaintiff's claim in- Arbitration will not work if legal contests are its bookends: a suit to compel or prevent arbitration, the arbitration itself, and a suit to enforce or set aside the award. Arbitration then becomes more costly than litigation, for if the parties had elected to litigate their disputes they would have had to visit court only once. A direct analogy can be drawn to primary agency jurisdiction in administrative law. Under this regime, agencies possess primary jurisdiction over disputes arising in areas that fall within that agency's exclusive area of expertise. ' Courts do not assert jurisdiction until the agency has first decided the case before it. 2 ' Similarly, just as the scope of review is limited by the FAA in the context of arbitration, so too is it constrained by the Administrative Procedure Act in the context of agency adjudication. Finally, the expertise concern is just as strong with agencies, since in both cases the primary decisionmaker possesses expertise lacked by the courts.
Allowing an expert to resolve the dispute is a primary reason parties contract for arbitration. ' Primary agency jurisdiction is a flexible concept, concerned with "promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties." It is called into play when a court, having unquestioned jurisdiction over a case involving matters governed by an administrative agency, determines which tribunal should make the initial adjudication, (Court's jurisdiction not ousted, but only postponed). The exercise of the court's discretion is guided in this situation by a desire for uniformity of regulation and the need for initial consideration by a body possessing special expertise in the issue presented. 126 "Congress has made clear its intent to favor arbitration by deferring to the expertise of arbitrators ... [ expertise than judges in the parties' particular field," and parties often explicitly include a clause in their contract requiring that the arbitrator have such expertise." 9 Courts, therefore, should not exercise jurisdiction to review the arbitrator's decision until the arbitrator, presumptively using his expertise, has decided the entire dispute. For just as the final judgment rule is motivated by concerns that subsequent developments in a case before a district court might greatly affect the significance of interlocutory decisions by the district court, it is just as likely that a final decision by the arbitrators will cast a partial award in a very different light."
C. Lack of Jurisdiction over Partial Arbitral Awards
The final judgment rule has been a part of the federal judicial system since the first Judiciary Act of 1789.
' Exceptions to this rule have been few and well defined and were, for the most part, created in response to FRCP's creation of a broad civil action.132 Arbitration, on the other hand, is completely contractual and allows cumbersome proceedings to be avoided with forethought. Because Congress has not authorized piecemeal judicial review of arbitral awards, analogies to FRCP 54(b) are inapt in the FAA context.
that the Advisory Committee did not want to overturn this rule, it is clear that courts do not have the legislature's approval to review arbitral awards beyond the scope listed here.
CONCLUSION
At first blush, the differences between allowing an appeal from a non-final decision by a district court judge for review in an appellate court and allowing an appeal from a partial arbitral award by an arbitrator for review in a district court seem trivial. However, they are not. Congress has not authorized appeals of partial awards by arbitrators. Furthermore, a loose finality requirement undermines the goals of deference to the arbitrators and the potential advantages gained due to the arbitrator's expertise. Finally, arbitration is a creature of contract and requires affirmative agreement before a party can be bound. Parties can address potential problems ex ante. Any attempt to address problems ex post rewrites the deal that the parties bargained for and should be avoided. Courts should therefore strictly enforce the finality requirement of 9 USC § 10(a)(4) unless Congress decides otherwise.
